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WHY CHRISTIANS SHOULD NOT BE DETERMINISTS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN SIN
Thomas Talbott

In response to Lynne Rudder Baker's intriguing paper, "Why Christians
Should Not Be Libertarians," I suggest that, even if a Christian simply lets
the chips fall where they may with respect to the dispute between libertar
ians and compatibilists, a Christian should not be a determinist. I also offer
for consideration a rather controversial non-Augustinian explanation for the
near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin.

In an article that appeared in this journal a few years ago,1 Lynne Rudder
Baker explained why, in her opinion, Christians should not be libertar
ians, where a libertarian (in the philosophical sense) is someone who
believes both that freewill exists and that freewill is incompatible with
the deterministic thesis that every event has a sufficient cause. In particu
lar, a libertarian thinks it impossible that a genuinely free choice should
be the product of sufficient causes over which the choosing agent has
no control. According to Baker, however, a Christian ought to reject this
libertarian view in favor of compatibilism, the philosophical view that,
contrary to what some might believe, freewill and determinism are quite
compatible. And, not surprisingly, her main theological consideration,
which she defended from an Augustinian perspective, was the traditional
Christian understanding of predestination and salvation by grace.
Now, for my own part, I seriously doubt that St. Paul's understanding of
predestination carried any implication of a rigorous overall determinism;
indeed, as I have elaborated elsewhere, it seems to me that Paul provided
a perfectly clear picture of how God could employ a person's uncaused
moral choices, whichever way they might go, as a means of producing his
predestined ends.2 But because compatibilism could be true even if the
thesis of determinism should be false, and because indeterminism may
seem to threaten freewill every bit as much as determinism does, I shall
not here argue that Christians should adopt the standard libertarian un
derstanding of either freewill or moral responsibility. Instead, I shall argue
as follows: Whether or not a Christian can consistently be a compatibilist,
consistently be a libertarian, or even consistently hold that the concepts
of freewill and moral responsibility are ultimately incoherent, the Christian
understanding of sin—the idea that sin stands in fundamental opposition
to God's will for our lives—is nonetheless incompatible with a thorough
going determinism. I shall then end the paper with a fairly controversial
proposal concerning how to understand the near universality and seem
ing inevitability of human sin.
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But first I want to compliment Baker for having distinguished carefully
the Augustinian doctrine of predestination and salvation by grace from
the Augustinian doctrine of limited election, the latter of which would
restrict God's mercy and compassion to a chosen few. She thus wrote: "My
suggestion is not to dilute the Augustinian doctrine of grace, but to em
brace its content fully, while only expanding its scope."3 As a universalist
myself, I wholeheartedly agree with such sentiments, even as I welcome
Baker's tentative endorsement of Christian universalism. But even as a
universalist, I hold that indeterminism plays a crucial role in creation, in
the drama of human history, and in the process whereby God brings his
tory to a glorious end through his providential control over it.
The U ltim ate C ause o f Sin

My most basic argument is not only relatively simple; it also clarifies why
Augustine himself never embraced, not even after his controversy with
Pelagius, a thoroughgoing determinism. For orthodox theology has always
rejected the idea that God is the ultimate cause of sin. So if sin exists and
God is not its ultimate causal source, then the thesis of determinism—and,
in particular, the thesis that God determines, either directly or indirectly
through secondary causes, every act of will—is false.
Now if this simple argument is sound, then, whatever the truth about
compatibilism, Christian theology clearly requires a distinction that Baker
appears to reject: the distinction between God's directly causing something
and his permitting it.4 Suppose, by way of illustration, that indeterminism
(of a genuinely random kind) really does exist at the quantum level and
that no sufficient cause existed for a change of state that occurred yester
day in a given radium atom. It follows that God did not causally determine
this change of state. He nonetheless retained a kind of providential control
over it in the sense that he could have prevented it. Were he, for example,
to have annihilated the atom at a time prior to the uncaused change of
state, or were he not to have created anything at all, he would have ef
fectively prevented the event from occurring.5 God therefore permitted
the event without directly causing it. Nor do we have any reason to deny,
so far as I can tell, that God might permit an undetermined choice to go in
one direction even though he might have preferred that it go in another.
Of course some in the Augustinian tradition do hold that God is the
ultimate cause of all sin, including its original introduction into the universe,6 and it appears as if Baker is at least sympathetic to such a view.7But
even the Reformed churches have typically rejected that view, however
inconsistently, as heretical and dishonoring to God. The Canons of Dort,
which are just about as Augustinian as you can get, thus declare that "The
cause or guilt of . . . unbelief as w ell as o f all other sins is no wise in God"
(my emphasis),8 and the Canons go on to declare concerning Adam and
his first sin:
His understanding was adorned with a true and saving knowledge
of his Creator, and of spiritual things; his heart and will were upright,
all his affections pure, and the whole man was holy. But, revolting
from God by the instigation of the devil and by his own free will,
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he forfeited these excellent gifts; and in the place thereof became . . .
wicked . . . obdurate in heart and will, and impure in his affections.9
Even though this (rather standard) understanding of the first human sin
seems to me philosophically untenable, not to mention exegetically unten
able as an interpretation of the relevant biblical materials (see below), the
clear motive here is to relieve God of both moral and causal responsibility
for the corruption of the human race. Augustine himself was especially
clear on the matter of causal responsibility: "How, then," he wrote, "can
a good thing be the efficient cause of an evil will? How, I ask, could good
be the cause of evil?"10 With respect to the fallen angels, Augustine also
wrote: "If one seeks for the efficient cause of their evil will, none is to be
found. . . . Thus, an evil will is the efficient cause of a bad action, but there
is no efficient cause of an evil will."11 You cannot get much more explicit
than that.
None of this, of course, will come as any news to Baker, who points out
herself the following important feature of Augustine's thought: "Perhaps
at creation, Adam had free will as the libertarians construe it, but the Fall
destroyed it for Adam and his descendants."12 That seems to me a correct
interpretation of Augustine's later view, though Augustine himself tended
to express it rather confusedly. For Augustine often spoke as if the entire
human race were itself a person who freely sinned against God, was con
demned, and subsequently lost the freedom to act rightly. He thus wrote:
"Man was . . . made upright, and in such a fashion that he could either
continue in that uprightness . . . or become perverted by his own choice.
Whichever of these two man had chosen, God's will would be done, either
by man or at least concerning him."13 And again: "Thus it was fitting that
man should be created . . . so that he could will both good and evil—not
without reward if he willed the good: not without punishment, if he willed
the evil."14 And finally: "For it was in the evil use of his free will that man
destroyed himself and his will at the same time . . . . [Accordingly, the] sin
which arises from the action of the free will turns out to be victor over the
will and the free will is destroyed."15
Nor was Augustine alone in speaking of humankind in this way; one
encounters similar expressions in a host of theologians and even in some
of the creedal statements. (Long before they became politically incorrect,
such statements as "Man was created with freewill," "Man sinned," and
"Man was justly condemned" always struck me as category mistakes,
because the term "man," when used to signify humankind, does not sig
nify a concrete person with the power to make choices.) But in any event,
Augustine took very literally the idea that we all sinned in Adam; and if
we fail to appreciate this, we are apt to miss two important points. First,
however confused his understanding of original sin might have been,
Augustine never changed his mind on the question of whether God is
the ultimate cause of sin. And second, even his defense of limited election
rested upon an incompatibilist understanding of moral guilt.
Consider first his conviction that the human race corrupted itself with
out any causal help from God. Not even when God hardens the hearts of
the non-elect, blinds them, and confirms them in their evil ways is any ac
tion of his a sufficient cause of their sin. For even here, Augustine insisted,
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God's actions are but a judicial response to an antecedent moral corrup
tion that God himself did not causally determine. So the fu ll explanation
of any human sin, including one that results from God's having hardened
a heart, will include a factor—namely, Adam's original sin and the subse
quent corruption of the human race—for which God was not the sufficient
cause. Put it this way: No human sin, according to Augustine, is the prod
uct of sufficient causes that lie either in eternity itself or in the past prior
to the time of Adam's first sin. Nor, as we have seen, is any non-human
sin (in the fallen angels, for example) the product of antecedent sufficient
causes either. According to Augustine, therefore, God is not the ultimate
cause of any sin.
Beyond that, Augustine's whole defense of his doctrine of limited elec
tion rested on an idea that virtually all compatibilists in the philosophical
world reject: the idea of intrinsic desert, 16 which entails that certain pun
ishments (or certain rewards, as the case may be) are intrinsically fittin g
responses to certain actions. As a result of original sin, he argued, we are
all part of a corrupt mass, are all guilty of a heinous sin against God, and
are all such that we deserve to suffer everlastingly for our sin. Everlasting
punishment, in other words, is the intrinsically fitting response to our sin
ful condition, which is somehow "our" doing, not God's. The non-elect
cannot justifiably complain, therefore, when God merely gives them the
punishment they deserve. For "who but a fool," Augustine declared,
"would think God unfair either when he imposes penal judgment on the
deserving or when he shows mercy to the undeserving?"17 Applying this
to the story of Jacob and Esau, Augustine went on to suggest that God
"loved Jacob in unmerited mercy, yet hated Esau with merited justice."18
His entire defense of limited election, then, rested upon the assumption that
we are all morally responsible for a libertarian free choice (albeit Adam's
original sin) that God himself did not causally determine. In Augustine's
own words, "the whole human race was condemned in its apostate head
by a divine judgment so just that even if not a single member of the race
were ever saved from it, no one could rail against God's justice."19
G race and Incom patibilism

The Augustinian understanding of limited election, which implies that
even those who die as unbaptized infants will be eternally separated from
God, is one that most Christian philosophers today would reject as both
morally repugnant and inconsistent with the loving nature of God. And as
I have already indicated, Baker suggests, correctly in my opinion, that we
should divorce the doctrine of predestination and salvation by grace from
this morally repugnant doctrine of limited election.
What some appear not to have appreciated, however, is that the Augustinian understanding of salvation by grace also rests upon an explicitly
incom patibilist conception of moral responsibility. Have not Christians tra
ditionally believed that, because they are saved by grace (or by God's causal
activity), they can take no credit for their own salvation or even for a virtu
ous character (where such exists)? Certainly Augustine held that view. For
even as the hard determinists, who are also incompatibilists, reject the idea
that we are morally responsible for actions whose sufficient causes lie in
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the distant past, so Augustine rejected the idea that we can credit ourselves
for the work of God within and its consequences in our lives. He argued,
in particular, that human beings have no power to save themselves—no
power, apart from the grace of God, even to will the good—and hence that
"neither does he who is saved have a basis for glorying in any merit of his
own."20 Or, as St. Paul put it: "For by grace you have been saved through
faith, and this [the faith] is not your own doing; it is the gift of God—not
the result of works, so that no one may boast."21
Now remarkably, some recent Augustinians appear to be compatibilists
with respect to one's responsibility for bad actions and yet incompatibilists with respect to one's responsibility for good actions. As a particularly
instructive illustration, consider how the Augustinian, Bruce Ware, treats
a person's decision in this life either to accept Christ or to reject him (what
ever, exactly, either expression might mean). According to Ware, "those
who reject Christ deserve the condemnation they receive, for they did
what they most wanted in that choice to say 'no' to God's gracious offer of
salvation."22 In the following quotation, moreover, Ware leaves little doubt
that, like the early compatibilists, he regards doing what one most wants
as a sufficient condition of being morally responsible for one's actions:
"So long as those who reject the gospel act out of their own natures and
inclinations, choosing and doing what they most want, . . . they are fully
responsible for their actions."23 But if doing what one most wants is a suf
ficient condition of being morally responsible for one's actions, should we
not also conclude, by parity of reasoning, that those who accept Christ
deserve moral credit for their faith, for their repentance, and for their
willingness and to say "Yes" to "God's gracious offer of salvation"? Not
according to Ware. For he immediately writes: "And those who receive
Christ cannot boast at all [or even take any credit] in their receiving the
eternal life that comes by faith . . . , for apart from God's effectual and gra
cious work in their lives, to open their hearts . . . and their eyes . . . , they,
too, would never have come."24 Ware thus agrees with Augustine that,
apart from God's gracious work in their hearts, Christians are absolutely
no different from those who reject the gospel. So if, according to Ware,
all credit for salvation goes to God because he graciously regenerates the
hearts of the elect, causing them to repent, it is surely fair to ask: Why
should not all the blame for damnation likewise go to God, if he brings
those who are eventually damned into an earthly existence, allows them
to inherit a sinful nature not of their own generating and over which they
have no control, blinds them to the truth, and causes them to he hard of
heart? The question is especially acute for any Christian who, like Baker,
appears to accept a fully deterministic scheme, but who also, unlike Baker,
insists that God restricts his grace to a limited elect.
Still, given her apparent acceptance of determinism, even Baker must
confront such questions as these: If God is the ultimate cause of both a
good and an evil will,25 then how are we to maintain, if at all, the tra
ditional Christian asymmetry between merited blame (in the case of sin)
and unmerited favor (in the case of salvation from sin)? If God's being the
ultimate cause of a person's bad will, as Baker seems to believe, does not
transfer the blame for the bad will from the person to God, why should
God's being the ultimate cause of a person's good will transfer credit for
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the good will from the person to God? And if Christians deserve moral
credit for the transformed will that God brings about in them, why should
they not take full credit for it? Arminians and other freewill theists typi
cally try to account for the relevant asymmetry in the following way: Sal
vation, faith, and a transformed heart, they insist, are themselves a gift
that we have the power to refuse. So if we freely exercise our power to
refuse the gift, then we have no one but ourselves to blame; but if we do
not freely refuse the gift, we still are in no position to take moral credit
for that which is essentially a freely offered gift. A strength of this Arminian view is that, unlike Baker's view, it does not make God the ultimate
cause of sin. But a weakness, in my opinion, is that it takes no account of
the New Testament idea that our natural unwillingness to be rescued is
part of the very condition from which we need to be rescued. Nor should
we liken Jesus Christ, I contend, to a lifeguard who throws a lifeline to a
drowning swimmer, leaving it up to the swimmer whether or not to grasp
the line; we should instead liken him to a lifeguard who drags an uncon
scious swimmer, incapable of even grasping a lifeline, out of the water to
safety. As Jesus himself put it, "And I, when I am lifted up from the earth,
will draw [or drag in much the way that a fisherman uses a net to drag fish
to shore] all people to myself."26
Now a Christian compatibilist might try to account for the asymmetry
between merited blame and unmerited favor by taking literally Paul's as
sertion that election and therefore salvation "depends not on human will or
exertion, but on God who shows mercy."27For the dispute between libertar
ians and compatibilists is presumably relevant only to that which is, either
directly or indirectly, the product of human will or exertion. So if, as Baker
suggests, "No finite will, on either a compatibilist or a libertarian concep
tion, has a causal role in bringing about salvation,"28 then it might seem as
if those Christians who are libertarians and those who are compatibilists
should be able to agree that salvation, at least, is not something for which
we are entitled to credit ourselves. But unfortunately, such a move will not
be of much help to a Christian compatibilist who believes that God is the
ultimate cause of sin. For even if salvation (including belief, faith, and trust
in God) is a gift that no human will "has a causal role in bringing about,"
it will nonetheless have effects in a person's life; a regenerated heart, for
example, will most definitely shape a person's will and subsequent choices.
So this leaves us with essentially the same question concerning these sub
sequent choices: If Christian saints, those whose hearts God has regen
erated, are not permitted to credit themselves for their virtuous choices,
such as those involved in genuine repentance, why should sinners blame
themselves for sins that God has also causally determined? And, alterna
tively, if sinners are required to accept blame for sins of which God is the
ultimate cause, why shouldn't Christian saints likewise credit themselves
for virtuous choices of which God is the ultimate cause? At the very least, a
Christian compatibilist who wants to maintain the traditional asymmetry
between merited blame and unmerited favor owes us some explanation of
why sinful choices and virtuous choices, where God is the ultimate cause
of both, should be treated so differently from each other.
My own view, for what it is worth, is that Christians need to rethink the
whole concept of moral responsibility in light of this remarkable fact: Both
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Jesus and Paul consistently rejected as inappropriate the very reactive at
titudes upon which so many rest their understanding of moral guilt.29
Personally, I doubt that the ideas of intrinsic desert and "metaphysical
guilt" played a substantial role, if any at all, in their thinking. Yes, Paul
explicitly stated in Romans 1:32 that those who commit certain sins are
"worthy of death," and this may initially appear to imply that death is
the intrinsically fitting punishment for sin. But the appearance is in fact
misleading. For within the context of Pauline theology as a whole, the
relationship between sin and death is clearly non-contingent. First, the rel
evant death, which Paul elsewhere described as "the wages" (or the price)
of sin30 and also as "the end" of sin,31 is spiritual death; it is separation
from God and from the ultimate source of human happiness. Nor could it
have been otherwise, because in sinning one precisely chooses death over
life, separation over reconciliation. In Paul's own words, "To set the mind
on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace."32
So death, which is the unavoidable consequence of sin, is its intrinsically
fitting punishment only in the sense that a painful burn is the intrinsically
fitting punishment for intentionally thrusting one's hand into a fire.
Whatever position one might take on the issue of intrinsic desert and
"metaphysical guilt," however, orthodox Christianity has always denied
that God is the sufficient cause of either sin or its unavoidable conse
quence, namely spiritual death. God is instead the "Great Destroyer" who
destroys sin and death in the end and thereby rescues his loved ones from
these two great enemies. But if that is true, how might we plausibly un
derstand this matter?
Indeterm inism , Separation, and the M ystery o f C reated P ersonhood

Reflect for a moment on the context in which our earliest choices in fa c t
arise. We all emerge as self aware beings and begin making choices in
a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and misperception, and behind our
earliest choices lie a host of genetically determined inclinations and envi
ronmental (including social and cultural) influences. Beyond that, our in
born instincts initially compel us as children to pursue, even as the higher
animals do, our own needs and interests, as we perceive (or misperceive)
them. Such a context comes close to guaranteeing, I should think, that
we would all start out in life repeatedly misconstruing our own interests,
given the Christian understanding of them, and repeatedly pursuing them
in misguided ways; it comes close to guaranteeing, in other words, that we
would repeatedly "miss the mark," which is the literal meaning of at least
one Hebrew word for sin. For even if a small child's behavior manifests a
good deal of causal contingency, as I believe it does, the absence of clar
ity together with the child's other natural impulses virtually guarantees
that it will at times act disobediently and in egocentric ways.33 That is the
enduring element of truth, as I see it, in the traditional understanding of
original sin—which, in my opinion, has nothing to do with inherited guilt.
Because we are born into a context that virtually guarantees misguided
choices almost from the beginning of our lives, particularly in the absence
of firm and loving parental guidance, and because our choices (or quasi
choices) made in ignorance34 begin shaping our character even before we
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are fully aware of what is happening to us, it is almost as if we were born
with a bad moral character—or an "inherited" sinful nature,35 to use the
theological term—not of our own choosing.
So how should a Christian who rejects both the idea of inherited guilt
and the idea that our current condition is a punishment for Adam's original
sin understand these matters? The answer lies, I believe, in the mystery
of created personhood. Although creatures such as ourselves are clearly
possible—we do, after all, exist—we know almost nothing about what is,
and is not, metaphysically possible in the matter of creating independently
rational creatures who are (a) aware of themselves as distinct from their
environment and from other people, (b) capable of acting on their own and
of making rational judgments concerning the best course of action, and (c)
capable of learning from experience and from the consequences of their
actions. It is easy enough to imagine an omnipotent being instantaneously
creating a self-aware, language using, fully rational, and morally mature
person who is capable of acting on his or her own, but I, for one, see no
reason to think this metaphysically possible at all.36 My aim here, however,
is not to defend my own convictions in this matter; it is instead to contrast
two very different metaphysical pictures and two very different ways of
explaining the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin.
Accordingly, as a contrast to the Augustinian explanation already dis
cussed, let us now consider the radically different hypothesis that God had
no choice, provided he wanted to create any persons at all, but to create
them in much the way he in fact created us—that is, he had no choice but to
permit their embryonic minds to emerge and to begin functioning on their
own in a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and indeterminism.37 The sup
position here is that in creating independent rational agents, or in bring
ing them into being from the abyss, so to speak, God had to satisfy certain
metaphysically necessary conditions of their coming into being, and these
include what I shall call, for want of a better expression, an initial sepa
ration from God. By this admittedly vague expression, I mean to imply,
among other things, a severance from God's direct causal control on the
metaphysical level and an experience of frustrated desire and frustrated
will—the sort of thing that naturally leads to a sense of estrangement and
alienation—on the psychological level.38 If these should be metaphysically
necessary conditions of our creation, then our very creation would virtu
ally guarantee39 the occurrence of error and misguided choices. So whereas
the Augustinians hold that we would never have inherited our sinful
dispositions and moral weaknesses, had Adam not failed his test in the
Garden of Eden, our alternative hypothesis implies that these are, from a
practical perspective, unavoidable consequences of conditions essential to
our creation—that is, conditions essential to our emergence as individual
centers of consciousness with an ability to make rational judgments and
to learn for ourselves important lessons from experience and from the con
sequences of our own actions. What some Christians will no doubt find
controversial here, perhaps even heretical, is the further implication that
our first parents came into being with the same sinful dispositions and
moral weaknesses common to the rest of us.
Before addressing that issue, however, I want first to clarify a point
and then to suggest some definite theological advantages, as I view them,
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in our alternative hypothesis. The point to be clarified is this: If creatures
such as ourselves could never have em erged in a fully deterministic con
text, then neither could human consciousness, human rationality, or hu
man freedom have so em erged . But even if one were to grant all of this, a
possible position would nonetheless be that our genuinely free actions, or
perhaps the freest of all our actions, are fully determined by our immedi
ate desires, beliefs, and reasonable judgments concerning the best course
of action. So in no way does our alternative non-Augustinian hypothesis
entail the standard libertarian conception of freewill. We are considering,
after all, two different ways of explaining the near universality and seem
ing inevitability of human sin, both of which reject the idea that we start
out as free moral agents. Whereas the Augustinians try to explain this by
appealing to the unavoidable effects of original sin in our lives, our alter
native explanation appeals to the unavoidable consequences of conditions
essential to our creation. It seems utterly non-controversial, moreover, that
young children are not yet moral agents and therefore not yet fr e e moral
agents, however causally undetermined much of their behavior might
be.40 But in addition to that, many traditional Christians, both inside and
outside the Augustinian tradition, have believed that, with the one ex
ception of Jesus Christ, all the descendents of Adam are already sinners,
already "dead" in their "trespasses and sins,"41 from the very beginning of
their moral consciousness. Such Christians typically take their cue from
St. Paul, who described the context in which our moral consciousness first
emerges as a kind of bondage or enslavement to the personified powers
of sin and death. Some of Paul's words—as when, for instance, he wrote:
"For sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, deceived me and
through it killed m e"42—might even be taken to imply that sin is some
thing that happens to us rather than something we do freely from the begin
ning of our lives.
Now as I see it, our alternative non-Augustinian hypothesis has several
advantages for Christians, and I shall here mention three—recognizing,
of course, that others may not regard them as advantages at all. First, and
perhaps most important of all, our alternative hypothesis enables us to
abandon two unfortunate Augustinian ideas: that of inherited guilt and
that of God's having pu n ished the entire human race for the sin of Adam. It
enables us to abandon these ideas, moreover, without compromising the
idea that, because sin and spiritual death threaten the very possibility of a
life worth living, they are genuine enemies that God is bound by his own
nature eventually to destroy. They are enemies in the sense that they stand
in direct opposition to God's will for our lives.
Second, our alternative hypothesis also enables us to deny that God is
the cause of sin even as we let the chips fall where they may with respect
to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Just where
the proverbial chips might fall will no doubt depend on a host of issues,
such as the nature of moral guilt, the point of holding people morally re
sponsible, and the question of alternative possibilities—issues that lie far
beyond the scope of this paper. But wherever the chips might fall in this
matter, it is perhaps worth pointing out that even a compatibilist such as
Daniel Dennett appears to concede that a pu rposive agent's non-coercive
control (or manipulation) of our desires, beliefs, and will is incompatible
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with genuine autonomy. Dennett thus distinguishes mere determinism from
various non-coercive form s o f control, arguing that, however exhaustively
it may determine our future, "the past does not control us," at least not in
the way a purposive agent might. It does not control us in the latter sense
because "there is nothing in the past to foresee and plan for our particular
acts"; neither are there "feedback signals from the present to the past for
the past to exploit."43 Remarkably, Dennett even concedes that a Laplacean
"superhuman intelligence" that also determines the future could easily
control us and would indeed undermine our compatibilist autonomy.44As
even Dennett appears to concede, therefore, not even compatibilist auton
omy could exist in a theistic universe in which God causally determines
every event.45
Finally, if our very creation requires an indeterministic process and
therefore a causal break from the past, then we can accept both an impor
tant claim that libertarians have made and an important objection to the
standard libertarian analysis. We can accept, on the one hand, the libertar
ian claim that none of our free actions are the product of sufficient causes
that lie in the distant past. For if, thanks to the causal break at the begin
ning of our own lives and the lives of our ancestors as well, none of our
actions, not even the determined ones, are the product of sufficient causes
that lie in the distant past, then neither are our free actions the product
of such causes. We can also accept, on the other hand, the frequently ex
pressed objection that indeterminism of any kind in the process of deliber
ating and choosing introduces a degree of randomness, even irrationality,
into it. The latter claim—which, so far as I can tell, no one has successfully
refuted46—accords nicely with the idea that, although God is not its cause,
sin is nonetheless something that happens to us early in life rather than
something we do freely from the beginning of our lives.
Is my point, then, that the concept of freedom is simply incoherent?
Not quite. Elsewhere I have suggested that a coherent account of freedom
will involve two crucial ideas: first, that freedom, like moral responsibility
and rationality, are a matter of degree, and second, that some of the very
conditions essential to our emergence as free moral agents are themselves
obstacles to a fully realized freedom—obstacles that can be overcome only
after our incipient rationality has begun to function on its own and we are
therefore capable of learning lessons for ourselves.47 Consider ignorance,
for example. Many have suggested that our freedom in relation to God
requires that we start out in a context where God remains hidden from us,
and I agree. But for as long as God's true nature and very existence remain
hidden from us, neither are we free to reject anything but a caricature of
God; hence, we are not truly free in relation to God. And similarly for
indeterminism: Even if our moral freedom requires that we start out in a
context of indeterminism, as I believe it does, the randomness and irratio
nality that indeterminism implies is nonetheless an obstacle to a fully real
ized freedom.48 So perhaps Paul, who regarded freedom as a consequence
of our salvation rather than as a precondition of it, had something to teach
us about freedom after all. For according to Paul, our earliest moral expe
rience arises from an emerging ability to understand moral rules (or the
moral law), and it is inevitably an experience of the will in bondage to sin.
Our salvation, therefore, consists in our being released from this bondage,
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so that our wills can be set "free from the law of sin and death."49 Put it
this way: God can correct us and eventually transform us only after we
have emerged as rational agents who can either cooperate in the process
or learn important lessons from our refusal to cooperate.50
Still, whatever the perceived advantages of our non-Augustinian hy
pothesis might be, some will no doubt object to its implication that our
first parents came into being with the same sinful dispositions and moral
weaknesses common to the human race as a whole. But as is now well
known (thanks to John Hick in particular), St Irenaeus, the Bishop of Lyons
between roughly 177 and 202 a . d ., did not view the first human sin as a fall
from a higher state to a lower one. In that respect, his view was quite dif
ferent from Augustine's, and I think it important to appreciate, first, how
well the above non-Augustinian hypothesis comports with the Irenaean
understanding of original sin, and second, how well the Irenaean under
standing comports with the primary sources of the Christian faith.
Augustine verses Irenaeus on Original Sin
As Iranaeus understood it, Adam's initial sin arose in the first place for
just this reason: Like every other child, he first emerged and began mak
ing choices in a morally immature state. Iranaeus even went so far as to
suggest that, when compared to the guardians of this world, namely the
angels, Adam had a distinct disadvantage. For whereas the angels "were
in their full development," Adam "was a little one; . . . he was a child
and had need to grow so as to come to his full perfection."51 The serpent,
Iranaeus declared, thus had little trouble in deceiving him: "the man was
a little one, and his discretion still undeveloped, wherefore also he was
easily misled by the deceiver" (my emphasis).52 As Iranaeus understood
the first human sin, then, it was virtually an inevitable consequence of
the unperfected condition in which our first parents initially emerged and
started making choices. They may have started out as innocently as any
other child—"their thoughts were innocent and childlike"53—but, like ev
ery other child, they made their first moral choices in a context of ambigu
ity, ignorance, and misperception, a context in which their judgment was
already clouded and they had no clear idea of what they were doing. Their
decision to eat the forbidden fruit, in other words, was no more a perfectly
free choice, however causally undetermined it may have been, than the
disobedient choices of a typical two year old are perfectly free.
Observe also how well this understanding of the first human sin com
ports with both the actual story of Adam and Eve, as recorded in Genesis,
and the New Testament commentary on it. So far as I can tell, not one
word in the Christian Scriptures implies that our first parents were any
less disposed to act in misguided and self-centered ways than their merely
human descendants are; nor does anything there imply that someone
not already in a "fallen" (or, more accurately, an unperfected) condition
might nonetheless succumb to temptation and sin. Were not Adam and
Eve subject to the same ambiguities, the same ignorance, and even the
same delusions to which the rest of us are subject as well? Like the rest
of us who enter this earthly life as newborn babies, they came into being
with no clear understanding of good and evil. So what could it possibly
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mean, I would ask, to say that someone with no clear understanding of
good and evil was nonetheless created morally upright? And what might
it mean to say that such a person had a clear understanding of who God
is, or to declare, as the Canons of Dort do, that Adam had "a true and sav
ing knowledge of his Creator"?54 In the Genesis account, Adam and Eve
certainly knew that some authority (a kind of parental figure, if you will)
had commanded them not to eat the fruit from the tree in the middle of
the garden; but like the children they were in all but appearance, they also
confronted this command without any understanding of why they were
required to obey it or why the command had been issued in the first place.
It is as if God had simply told them, as loving parents sometimes do with
immature children and in an effort to protect them from danger: "You
must obey this command because I said so!" And like the children they
were in all but appearance, their eyes were opened to their own imperfec
tions or sinful propensities (the symbol for which in the story is their nakedness)55 only after their emerging wills had already mired them in an act
of disobedience. It therefore seems to me quite plausible for a Christian to
think of this story not as an account of how human beings came to acquire
a "sinful nature" in the first place, but rather as an account of how our first
parents' natural propensity to "miss the mark" originally manifested itself
in the context of ambiguity and illusion in which they first emerged.
Certainly the idea that Adam and Eve came into being with the same
imperfections and egocentric dispositions common to human beings in
general is no more philosophically problematic than the idea that an in
herited sinful nature was God's supposedly just punishment of the human
race as a whole for the sin of Adam and Eve. The idea that all humans
beings, including Adam and Eve, begin life with the same imperfections
and egocentric dispositions also seems to accord very well with Paul's
magnificent vision of creation in two stages. As I have expressed this vi
sion elsewhere:
The first Adam, according to Paul, 'was from the earth, a man of
dust' and 'became a living being'; the second was not from the earth,
but 'from heaven' and 'became a life-giving spirit' (I Cor. 15:45 and
47). The first Adam thus represents the first stage in the creation of
God's children: the emergence of individual human consciousness
in a context of ambiguity, illusion, sin, and death; the second Adam,
or Jesus Christ, represents the second stage: the divine power that
successfully overcomes all sin and death and therefore all separation
from God, so that the true Sons and Daughters, or the true creations
of God, can emerge.56
Paul also made the following statement: "As was the man of dust, so are
those who are of the dust,"57 and this at least suggests that Adam and
his descendents ("those who are of the dust") all come into being in the
same context of ambiguity, ignorance, and misperception and with similar
dispositions and propensities. The Psalmist thus declared that the Lord
"does not deal with us according to our sins, nor repay us according to our
iniquities." Why not? Because "he knows how we were made; he remem
bers that we are dust."58
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In any event, I find this vision of creation in two stages exceedingly sug
gestive. God must first bring us into being as immature rational agents;
then, once we are independent of God's direct causal control and our in
cipient rationality begins functioning on its own, God can relate to us not
merely as the Creator who designed us and certainly not as a manipula
tive agent who controls all of our desires, beliefs, and judgments, but as
a loving parent who works with us, guides us, and corrects us even as he
permits us to learn valuable lessons from experience and from the con
sequences of our actions. According to the Christian religion, moreover,
love is the one power in the universe that transforms without manipu
lating; hence, it is through sacrifice and acts of self-giving love that God
will eventually transform us without manipulating us. And, of course,
the supreme sacrifice, as Christians understand it, was God's Son having
“emptied himself," having taken "the form of a slave," and having suf
fered a humiliating death on a Cross59—though it was also, according to
the author of Hebrews, the Son's triumph over death and the fear of it that
enabled him to "free those who all their lives were held in slavery by the
fear of death."60
C onclusion

If God is not the cause of sin and did not in effect program us to be sin
ners, and if, according to Christian theology, we are all "by nature" sinners
nonetheless, the question naturally arises concerning the best explanation
for the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin. In op
position to the standard Augustinian explanation, which appeals to the
corrupting effects of original sin on the human race as a whole, I have
recommended that Christians consider, if only for the purpose of for
mulating objections to it, the very different hypothesis that God had no
choice, provided he wanted to create any persons at all, but to permit their
embryonic minds to emerge in a context that virtually guarantees errone
ous judgments and misguided choices of a kind that Christians typically
associate with sin. I have no doubt that such a hypothesis will raise, as
it should, many questions in the minds of thoughtful Christians—most
notably questions about the nature of sin and one's responsibility for it.
Once the questions are raised, the objections are formulated, and various
replies are examined, perhaps then we will be in a better position to assess
this alternative hypothesis in a reasonable way.61
W illam ette U niversity
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